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PARENTS' RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN DEPENDENCY AND NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS
While much attention has been focused on the constitutional rights of
juveniles since the United States Supreme Court's decision in In re
Gault,1 constitutional rights of parents in juvenile court proceedings
have not been widely recognized. In child-dependency and child-neglect
proceedings, indigent parents threatened with the loss of custody2 of
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). A 15 year old boy was committed to a state training school
as a delinquent. He had been accused of making a lewd phone call and was adjudged
a delinquent at a hearing at which he had no counsel, no one was sworn, and no official
record was made. The Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment is not for
adults alone and that a juvenile in delinquency proceedings has a right to counsel, notice
of charges, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and a privilege against
self-incrimination. The Court cited the following authorities numerous times in support
of its holding: Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) ; REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S
CoumIssIoN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUsTICE: THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SociTY 81-86 (1967) ; Lehman, A Juvenile's Right to Counsel in a
Delinquency Hearhg, 17 Juv. CT. JUDGES' J. 53 (1966). These authorities support ex-
tending Gault's logic to a right to counsel for parents.
2. Custody proceedings for purposes of this note do not refer to those between
parents incident to divorce but to proceedings initiated by the state. State initiated
custody proceedings fall into two broad categories, termination of parental rights and
dependency or neglect proceedings. The difference between these two categories is pri-
marily in the permanence and scope of the result.
Termination involves the formal and permanent deprivation of all the traditional
rights and duties of a parent, including those involved with custody, control, inheritance
and support. Termination usually arises in the context of adoption. For example, if a
divorced mother remarries and her new husband wants to adopt her children, he cannot
do so unless the natural father's rights are terminated. In Indiana, the natural father
may consent, or termination may be decreed without his consent under certain condi-
tions, such as failure to support the children. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 31-3-1-6, -7 (Code ed.
1973).
Dependency and neglect, on the other hand, are both considered temporary and gen-
erally affect only rights to custody and control of children, not all underlying legal
rights. Nevertheless, an adjudication of dependency or neglect can result in taking the
child from the parents' custody and placing him in an institution for children or a foster
home, a step which may have a lasting detrimental effect on the family. Furthermore,
while such custody deprivations are theoretically temporary, as a practical matter they
may be permanent. Brief for Plaintiff at 6, Cleaver v. Wilcox, 40 U.S.L.W. 2658 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 22, 1972). Another possible, less drastic result is allowing the child to re-
main with the parents under court supervision. See, Note, Representation in Child-
Neglect Cases: Are Parents Neglected?, 4 CoLum. J. LAw & Soc. PROB. 230 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Representation].
Traditionally, dependency has implied nonsupport which may be innocent if it is
the result of parental inability, while neglect has implied that the child is being mis-
treated. Neglect, therefore, conveys the idea of guilty parents while the parents of a,
dependent child might not be considered culpable. This distinction has been blurred in
Indiana where the statutes defining dependency and neglect, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 31-5-5-1,
-2 (Code ed. 1973), overlap so that nonsupport, for example, might cause a child to be
adjudicated either dependent or neglected, or both. , In general, neglect is the broader
term. It includes cruelty to a child as well as failure to properly care for and support
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their children are often not afforded the aid of counsel.8  Whether
indigent parents are provided with court appointed counsel in such
cases has generally turned on state statutory provisions.4 However, two
recent cases, Cleaver v. Wilcox' and In re Ella B.,' treat the question of
court appointed counsel for indigent parents as one of constitutional
dimension. The constitutional arguments in favor of finding a parental
right to counsel are based on the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment. Recent Supreme Court cases interpreting
those clauses lend support to the conclusion that parents have a right to
be represented when threatened with loss of their children." In addition,
practical policy reasons support state provision of counsel for indigent
parents.
This note will outline the constitutional arguments, describe the
recent developments, and discuss the policy considerations relating to
provision of court appointed counsel for indigent parents in child-neglect
and dependency proceedings. The state of Indiana law on this issue is
also examined.
DUE PROCESS: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
As ESSENTIAL TO A FAIR HEARING
Both the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment have been interpreted by the Supreme Court to require the
appointment of counsel in many criminal prosecutions,' and to require
the child. For a detailed discussion of definitions see Note, Dependency and Neglect:
Indiana's Definitional Confusion, 45 IND. L.J. 606 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Depend-
ency & Neglect].
3. See, e.g., In re George S., 18 Cal. App. 3d 788, 96 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1971) ; In re
Robinson, 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 954, 964
(1971) ; i re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (Md. Ct. App. 1968). The right to ap-
pointed counsel has also been denied in a termination case. Casper v. Huber, 85 Nev.
474, 456 P.2d 436 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1012 (1970). But see Chambers v. Dist.
Ct., 261 Ia. 31, 152 N.W.2d 818 (1967); Munkelwitz v. Hennepin County Welfare Dep't,
280 Minn. 377, 159 N.W.2d 402 (1968).
4. E.g, ARI. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-225A (Supp. 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
17-66b (Supp. 1973); IDAHO CODE § 16-1631 (Supp. 1973) (provides for counsel for
parents if requested) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701.20 (Smith-Hurd 1972) ; KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38.820 (1963) (appears that counsel is appointed only if parents will be perma-
nently deprived of their rights) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155 (1971) ; N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-20-26 (Supp. 1973) (North Dakota adopted the UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT Acr);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.351 (Page Supp. 1972); OKcLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §
1109(b) (Supp. 1972) (apparently limited to termination of parental rights).
5. 40 U.S.L.W. 2658 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 1972).
6. 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972).
7. Cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972) ; Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) ; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
8. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932).
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provision by the state of other trial-related services in certain coercive
situations.9 Due to the untertain future of the Supreme Court's interpre-
tion of the equal protection clause, 0 tli.e due process argument is prob-
ably more likely to be successful in providing indigent parents with
counsel in dependency and neglect proceedings.
Whenever the state seeks to deprive a person of liberty or property
due process requires a fair hearing.1 The Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized a right to counsel for criminal defendants whose liberty is
at stake. 2 In Powell v. Alabamd'3 the Court establis!hed the principle
that availability of counsel is one prerequisite to a fair hearing. Although
Powell was a capital case, the Court has relied on its reasoning in extend-
ing the right to court appointed counsel to indigent defendants in non-
capital and nonfelony cases.' 4 Powell and the line of cases which followed
were based on the premise that the right to be heard is fundamental to
our system of justice, and that this right may be futile without the
assistance of counsel. 5
The right to counsel is not limited to criminal prosecutions, but has
been extended to some civil cases. Courts are rejecting civil-criminal
distinctions and looking to the substantive effect of the proceedings. In
In re Gault6 the Supreme Court rejected the civil label for juvenile court
hearings as misleading.' The Court pointed out that juveniles accused
of delinquency are subjected to processes and sanctions essentially like
those of the crimin al law."s The juvenile accused could be adjudicated a
delinquent and confined to a school or other institution. Recognizing
the possible consequences of a finding of delinquency, and noting the
potential for abuse in the informal procedure of the juvenile court sys-
tem, the Court held that an accused in juvenile court needs the assistance
of counsel to understand what is happening and to safeguard rights
9. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (waiver of filing fees for indigent
seeking divorce) ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel for indigent at
appellate level) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (free transcript for appellate
review).
10. See notes 52-57 infra & text accompanying.
11. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) ; Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535 (1971) (state could not deprive a person of his driver's license without a hearing)
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
12. See cases cited note 8 supra.
13. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
14. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in noncapital
felony cases); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel in any
prosecution which could result in imprisonment).
15. 287 U.S. at 68-69.
16. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. Id. at 27-30.
18. Id. at 36.
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which could be lost because a parent or child may not know of their
existence. 9
Relying on Gault, a federal appeals court in Heryford v. Parker" held
that due process required provision of counsel for a juvenile subjected
to involuntary civil commitment proceedings.2 The court emphasized
that whatever the label given the proceedings, since individual liberty
was in jeopardy, the juvenile had a right to be represented at the hear-
ing.2
2
The civil-criminal distinction has also been abrogated in an area
even more closely analogous to dependency and neglect proceedings. In
State v. Jamison,2 1 the Oregon Supreme Court implicitly rejected the
civil label in holding that counsel should have been appointed for an
indigent mother whose parental rights were being terminated. Although
Oregon has a statute which gives the judge discretion to appoint counsel
in juvenile court cases, 24 the court's holding was based on the due process
rights of a person faced with the threat of termination of parental
rights.25 The court observed:
[t]he permanent termination of parental rights is one of the
most drastic actions the state can take against its inhabitants.
It would be unconscionable for the state forever to terminate
the parental rights of the poor without allowing such parents
to be assisted by counsel.2"
In explaining its decision, the court analogized the situation to that in-
volved in Gault. In both cases the state was seeking to interfere in the
family relationship by removing the child from the custody and control
of the parent. Further, the Oregon court said that an indigent parent
must be advised of her right to court appointed counsel and that failure
to request appointment of counsel is not a waiver unless the parent knows
she has the right.27
While Jamison involved a termination proceeding, there is nothing
19. Id.
20. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
21. Id. at 396. The case arose in federal court on a habeas corpus petition after
petitioner's son had been involuntarily committed to the Wyoming Training School for
the Feeble-minded and Epileptic.
22. Id.
23. 251 Ore. 114, 444 P.2d 15 (1968).
24. Id. at 116, 444 P.2d at 17. The statute involved has since been amended to make
the appointment of counsel mandatory for indigent parents or children requesting such as-
sistance. OaE. REV. STAT. § 419.498(2) (1971).
25. 251 Ore. at 117, 444 P.2d at 17.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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to suggest that its reasoning should be confined to that context. Parents
in dependency or neglect proceedings are faced with penalties similar
to those involved in termination. If a child is adjudicated dependent or
neglected, the parents may be subjected to at least a temporary loss of
custody and control of the child.28 This is in itself a serious penalty, and
parents subject to it must be afforded due process for the same reasons
as in termination cases.
Probably the most striking case in which the civil-criminal dis-
tinction was broken down for purposes of due process was Boddie v.
Connecticut.29  In Boddie, the Supreme Court held it a denial of due
process for a state to refuse indigents access to the courts for divorce
solely because of their inability to pay filing fees.3 The majority opinion
limited the holding to divorce cases because (1) the state has a monopoly
on the power to legally dissolve marriages,3 and (2) there are important
fundamental liberties associated with the right to marry and raise a
family. 2 Justice Black, dissenting, expressed disapproval of the hold-
ing" and implied that the majority's attempt to limit it to divorce was
neither logical nor practicable. 4 Although the majority persuasively
argues that the divorce situation is an especially appropriate place for
the recognition of due process rights, there is merit in Justice Black's
criticism that the justifications applicable to divorce would be present
in other nominally civil cases.
The argument that Boddie is not analogous because the filing fee
resulted in deprivation of access to the courts while parents in dependency
and neglect proceedings do not have that problem misses the point.
Parents are in court in these proceedings because of action initiated by
the state. Therefore, the denial of counsel in a dependency or neglect
proceeding is as serious as a deprivation of access because without
counsel the parents' position cannot be effectively communicated. 5
28. See note 2 supra. Parents may be deprived of custody theoretically only tem-
porarily, but if custody is taken away for an indefinite period of time, the actual differ-
ences betveen this kind of temporary loss of custody and actual termination may be
minimal. For a discussion of the difficulties of regaining custody see Comment, The
Custody Question and Child Neglect Rehearings, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 478 (1968).
29. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Boddie was a class action by welfare mothers who wanted
to sue for divorce but were unable to pay the filing fees.
30. Id. at 374.
31. Id. at 376, 383.
32. Id. at 376.
33. Id. at 389 (Black, J., dissenting).
34. See id. at 391-92. See also Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954,
956 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting). In Meltzer, Black made explicit a point hinted at in
his Boddie dissent, that once the Boddie majority breached the civil-criminal distinction,
there is no logical way to limit the extension of due process requirements to divorce cases.
35. See it re Ella B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972) ;
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If anything, the arguments for disregarding the civil-criminal dis-
tinction are stronger in cases in which parents may lose their children
than in divorce cases. Adjudication of dependency or neglect of a child
may be the first step toward actual termination of parental rights."8 The
adjudication of dependency or neglect itself may be used as evidence if
the state seeks permanent termination." Even temporary loss of parental
custody may ,have a lasting detrimental effect on the family relationship.
These considerations are important because in determining the require-
ments of due process the pivotal issue should be the degree to which the
state is affecting individual rights, and not whether the proceeding is
labelled civil or criminal.
In Argersinger v. Hamliass the Supreme Court recognized the im-
portance of the right of a criminal defendant not to be deprived of his
liberty, even for a short time, without having been accorded all the pro-
cedural safeguards of due process, including the right to appointed
counsel.3 9 Deprivation of liberty by imprisonment is serious, but, as
Justice Powell pointed out in his concurring opinion in Argersinger,
there are other liberties as important and deprivations more severe than
a few days in jail:
[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that
property as well as liberty, may not be taken from a person
without affording him due process of law. The majority opinion
suggests no constitutional basis for distinguishing between
deprivations of liberty and property. In fact, the majority sug-
gests no reason at all for drawing this distinction. The logic it
advances for extending the right to counsel to all cases in which
Representation, supra note 2.
The Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Kras, 93 S. Ct. 631 (1973) does
not detract from Boddie's applicability to right to counsel in custody deprivation proceed-
ings. Kras was distinguished from Boddie on the basis of exclusivity, holding that there
are alternatives to bankruptcy available unlike divorce, so that a denial of access to the
courts for failure to pay filing fees is not a denial of due process or equal protection.
Id. at 636. In this regard it is significant that in a custody proceeding the parent is co-
erced by the state to make a court appearance; no alternatives are available. Second, the
Court in Kras held that a discharge in bankruptcy is not a fundamental right for which
access to courts is constitutionally guaranteed. Id. at 638. In Boddie, however, a fun-
damental right was at stake. Similarly, in a custody proceeding the parent's fundamen-
tal right of control over the child may be unconstitutionally deprived in the absence of
counsel.
36. See notes 2 & 8 supra.
37. Brief for Plaintiff at 6-7, Cleaver v. Wilcox, 40 U.S.L.W. 2658 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 22, 1972). See also CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 232(b), (c) (West Supp. 1973); IND.
Aim. STAT. § 31-3-1-7 (Code ed. 1973).
38. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
39. Id. at 27, 28, 37, 40.
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the penalty of any imprisonment is imposed applies equally well
to cases in which other penalties may be imposed. Nor does the
majority deny that some "non-jail" penalities are more serious
than brief jail sentences.4"
Upon examination of the parent's position in dependency and neglect
proceedings, it becomes clear that many of the elements considered im-
portant by the Supreme Court in requiring appointment of counsel for
indigents are present. Parent respondents in dependency and neglect
proceedings may be subjected to a serious deprivation of liberty in losing
custody of their children. The logic of Argersinger suggests that indigent
parents may not be deprived of their fundamental right to raise their
children without being afforded the safeguards of due process of law,
including the right to court appointed counsel.
The distinction between dependency and neglect proceedings and
criminal prosecutions is further weakened by the fact that in both cases
the state initiates the action against the individual. In this way de-
pendency and neglect proceedings are distinguishable from other civil
actions.
If the parents' due process right to counsel is recognized, it can be
met only by providing separate counsel for parents and for the child.
While juvenile courts have the power to gravely affect the rights of
both parents and children, it is generally only the child's right to counsel
that has been recognized. 4 It has been argued that the child's counsel
can adequately represent the parents.42 However, since the interests of
the parents and the child may not be the same in dependency and neglect
proceedings, the child's counsel cannot adequately protect the rights of
the parents.43 Separate counsel is the only way to avoid conflicts of
interest for the lawyers involved.
40. Id. at 51-52 (Powell, J., concurring).
41. See note 1 suepra & text accompanying.
42. See, e.g., Note, Child Neglect: Due Process for the Parents, 70 CoLum. L. R-v.
465 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Child Neglect] ; Representation, supra note 2.
43. The procedural status of these cases should illustrate the adversary nature of
the proceedings. Even if the state's participation is characterized as protective of the
child, it is the parent's behavior which is being scrutinized. Thus in effect, it is the
state and the child against the parents.
The parens patriae doctrine can be easily rejected as a justification for -denying
counsel to parents in dependency and neglect proceedings. The Supreme Court noted in
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), that the doctrine of pare)hs patriae underlies the juvenile
court system and that the doctrine has been used to justify procedural informality.
Id. at 17. In theory, the state is acting to protect children from overreaching adults, so
the state as protector is not obligated to afford children due process. Gault, of course, de-
nied the applicability of the parens patriae rationale to juveniles accused of delinquency.
It should also be clear that parens patriae cannot justify denying counsel to parents, who
are adults and are not being protected by the state.
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In summary, parents' due process rights to appointed counsel in
dependency and neglect cases derive from Supreme Court recognition of
a right to counsel in many criminal prosecutions. In light of the
Supreme Court's abrogation of the civil-criminal distinction, the crucial
issue has become the severity of the deprivation of liberty at stake.
Deprivation of parental rights, even temporarily, is sufficiently serious
for due process to require the appointment of counsel for indigents.
EQUAL PROTECTION: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND
SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment gives
special protection to fundamental rights.44 Parents' rights to raise their
own children in the manner they choose has been recognized by the
,Supreme Court as fundamental.4" Unless there is a compelling state
interest to justify a classification which is based on suspect criteria and
affects fundamental rights, the classification will be held to be a denial
of equal protection. 6 The more important the fundamental right in-
volved, the less suspect the classification need be for a court to subject
it to strict scrutiny and require the state to meet a higher burden than
mere rationality to justify the classification.47
Wealth has been treated as a suspect classification by the Supreme
Court in Griffin v. Illinois s and Douglas v. California.9 In Griffin,
the Court held a state's refusal to furnish a free trial transcript to an
indigent criminal appellant to be a violation of the equal protection clause.
The plurality opinion stated:
[I]t is true that a State is not required by the Federal Consti-
tution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate re-
view at all .... But that is not to say that a State that does
grant appellate review can do so in a way that discriminates
against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty."
44. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) ; Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971) ; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ; Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
45. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1971) ; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1964); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528
(1953) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (dictum).
46. Cases cited note 44 supra; Cox, Foreward-Constitutonal Adjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91 (1966).
47. See cases cited notes 44 & 45 supra; Michelman, Foreward-On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 34 (1969).
48. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
49. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
50. 351 U.S. at 18.
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In Douglas the Court reiterated the Griffin principle that "there
can be no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys 'depends
on the amount of money he has.' "s'
The holdings in Griffin and Douglas may support a right to free
counsel for indigent parents ir dependency and neglect proceedings.
However, the Supreme Court's holding in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodrguez,2 refusing to find a denial of equal pro-
tection in a public school financing system that resulted in significantly
different per pupil expenditures and its holding in United States v. Kras5
refusing to waive bankruptcy filing fees for the indigent, may indicate
a reluctance to extend the treatment of wealth as a suspect dassification
to the civil area. Boddie v. Connecticut,4 which waived filing fees in
divorce proceedings, may turn out to be the limit of that extension. Yet,
if the Court is ever again willing to find wealth suspect in any area, the
recognition of a right to counsel in dependency and neglect proceedings
would be the logical next step.5" These proceedings involve the family
relationship, long recognized by the Supreme Court as a fundamental
interest.56 Further, because the state in dependency and neglect pro-
ceedings threatens parents with the loss of custody of their children,
the severity of the possible sanction makes these cases analogous to
criminal prosecutions."7
Empirical data showing that the results in dependency and neglect
proceedings are significantly affected by whether parents are represented
by attorneys provides support for the argument that an indigent parent
without counsel has been denied equal protection. A study done in New
York family courts revealed that parents who were not represented by
counsel were much more likely than parents who were represented to
lose custody of their children as a result of child neglect hearings. s Even
if one were to suppose that parents who cannot afford counsel are some-
what more neglectful than parents who can, the great disparity in re-
51. 372 U.S. at 355.
52. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
53. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
54. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
55. The Supreme Court had an opportunity to take this step, but declined to do so
in Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, denying cert. to 225 Ga. 91, 166
S.E.2d 88 (1971). Justice Black wrote a spirited dissent, arguing that a parent in
danger of being deprived of her child had an interest more fundamental than that in
Boddie and her interest should be protected by appointed counsel. Id. at 959.
56. Cases cited note 45 supra.
57. See Note, Indigent Parents in Juvenile Proceedings: The Right to Appointed
Counsel, 1969 LAw & Soc. ORDE 467, 475; Representation, supra note 2, at 252-53; Child
Neglect, supra note 42, at 477.
58. Representation, supra note 2, at 241.
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suits suggests that the presence of counsel contributes significantly to
the outcome of the proceedings.
The importance of the parents' rights require that wealth be treated
as suspect so that indigent parents will be provided with appointed
counsel. If wealth is considered suspect here, the state will have to show
a more compelling reason for denying counsel to parents confronted with
potential loss of their children than -the parents' poverty. Probably the
state's only arguments in support of the classification will be administra-
tive convenience and economy, but these have been held not to be com-
pelling."' Without a compelling state interest, the failure to provide
counsel to indigents would be a denial of equal protection.
Two CASES RECOGNIZING PARENTAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL
While the availability of court appointed counsel for parents is
determined by statute is most states,"0 two influential courts have re-
cognized a constitutional right to counsel for indigent parents in de-
pendency and neglect proceedings. The New York Court of Appeals in
In re Ella B."' held unconstitutional a neglect proceeding in which a
mother without counsel was deprived of custody of her child. 2 In
Cleaver v. Wilcox"3 a federal court enjoined a California state court
from hearing a dependency case without appointing counsel for the
mother.
In In re Ella B., after the judge had read the petition of charges, he
and the mother engaged in the following dialogue:
[The Court:] You may be represented by an attorney in this
proceeding, in which case you must obtain one yourself, and
pay for him out of your own funds, or you may waive an
attorney and either admit or deny the facts in the petition if
you want. Do you want an attorney?
Mrs. B.: No.
The Court: Do you admit the facts in the petition?
Mrs. B.: Yes I do."'
59. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) ; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) ; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
60. For a list of state statutes which provide for counsel see note 4 supra.
61. 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972).
62. Id. at 357, 285 N.E.2d at 290, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
63. 40 U.S.L.W. 2658 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 1972). This case was appealed to the
9th circuit, but the appeal was dismissed on the appellant's motion.
64. 30 N.Y.2d at 355, 285 N.E.2d at 289, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
176
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Without further inquiry into the fadts, the judge made a finding of
neglect.6" The child was then taken from the mother's care by the
authorities. Afterwards the m6ther'heard about the Legal Aid Society arid
obtained its aid in appealing the finding of neglect. The appellate
division affirmed the finding and rejected her claim of error in the
lower court's failure to advise her that if she could not afford to par
she was entitled to court appointed counsel.66 The Court of Appeals,
however, held that there was a constitutional right to counsel.67  It
further found that the right had not been waived since the judge's state-
ment, quoted above, was misleading as to the availability of appoiited
counsel." The court's holding was influenced by the importance of
the parent's interest in the care and control of the child as well as the
potential threat of criminal charges against the 'mother.6 The Court
of Appeals based its holding of a right to counsel on the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amerdment.7 The iisult
was clearly not based on statute because the New York statute provides
counsel only for the child, not for the parents.71
Cleaver v. Wilcox"2 reached a similar conclusion on similar reason-
ing. In Cleaver, a mother brought a class action in federal court to en-
join state dependency proceedings in which she had been denied court
appointed counsel. The court granted the injunction, rejecting the state's
contention that appointment of counsel was not required because the
proceeding was civil in nature. The court refused to be bound by labels
attached to the proceedings in determining the rights of persons threatened
65. Id. at 356, 285 N.F_2d at 289, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 357, 285 N.E.2d at 290, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
68. Id. at 358, 285 N.E.2d at 290, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
69. Id. at 356, 285 N.E.2d at 290, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
70. In our view, an indigent parent, faced with the loss of a child's society as
well as the possibility of criminal charges . . . is entitled to the assistance of
counsel. A parent's concern for the liberty of the child, as well as for his care
and control, involves too fundamental an interest and right . . . to be relin-
quished to the State without the opportunity for a hearing, with assigned coun-
sel if the parent lacks the means to retain a lawyer. To deny legal assistance
under such circumstances would-as the courts of other jurisdictions have al-
ready held . . . -constitute a violation of his due process rights and, in light
of the express statutory provision for legal representation for those who can
afford it, a denial of equal protection of the laws as well.
Id.
71. See N.Y. FAmiLY CT. AcT §§ 241-49 (McKinney 1963).
72. 40 U.S.L.W. 2658 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 1972). See also Danforth v. State
Dep't of Health & Welfare, - Me. -, 303 A.2d 794 (1973). In a well reasoned
opinion, the Maine Supreme Court held that indigent parents against whom a custody
petition is instituted have a constitutional right to appointed counsel. The Supreme
Court of Nebraska apparently reached the same result applying similar reasoning in
State v. Caha, - Neb. - , 208 N.W.2d 259 (1973).
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with deprivation of fundamental rights. Pointing out that the state was
the moving party and was seeking to deprive the natural parent of her
right to care for the child, the court stated that it would be unfair and a
denial of due process to allow the state to interfere in the family relation-
ship without affording the mother the assistance of counsel.73 The court
found that the parent's fundamental interest in the custody of her
children could not be curtailed without a meaningful opportunity to be
heard, including the assistance of counsel.74 One of the factors which
led to the court's finding was the gross imbalance in expertise and ex-
perience between the state and the accused parent. Moreover, because
the interest at stake was considered fundamental, the court found the
classification on the basis of wealth to be a denial of equal protection
unless the state could show some compelling interest to justify denial
of counsel to indigents.75 The only interest the state had advanced was
avoidance of the expense of court appointed attorneys. The court con-
cluded that avoidance of expense is not a compelling state interest suf-
ficient to justify denial of counsel to parents.7"
These two cases may lead other courts to a greater judicial awareness
of parental rights in dependency and neglect proceedings. The approach
of the courts in Cleaver and Ella B. is worthy of emulation because it
looks beyond form to substantive rights.
POLIcY REASONS FOR APPOINTED COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT PARENTS
The policies of elimination of arbitrariness and improvement of
the quality of justice in dependency and neglect proceedings support
the appointment of counsel for indigent parents. A positive by-product
of providing counsel would be increased parental confidence in the
integrity of the judicial process and diminished hostility toward the
courts.7
Traditionally, the presence of lawyers in juvenile courts has been
opposed on the basis of the countervailing policy of informality and the
fear that lawyers would subvert those informal processes.78 In order
to evaluate this argument, two questions must be considered: (1)
whether juvenile court informality is worth preserving; and (2) whether
73. 40 U.S.L.W. at 2658.
74. Id. at 2658, 2659.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).
78. See, e.g., Tamilia, Neglect Proceedings and the Coniflict Between Law and So-
cial Work, 9 DUQUESNE L. Rav. 579, 589 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Neglect Proceed-
ings] ; Representation, supra note 2, at 250.
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lawyers representing parents in dependency and neglect proceedings
hinder the decisionmaking process.
The Supreme Court in GaultT 9 made it clear that informal pro-
cedures inadequately protect individual rights. The Court said: "[J]uve-
nile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion is
frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.""0 Informality,
with its obvious lack of procedural restraints on judicial discretion, may
cause the person penalized by the court to feel he has not been treated
impartially. Having the aid of counsel would not only protect parental
rights, but also make parents feel less alienated and victimized by the
process and its results.8"
The question of whether lawyers would subvert the juvenile court
processes cannot be answered definitively. A survey of judges in th6
New York juvenile court system indicates that the judges themselves
feel representation of parents in dependency and neglect proceedings
would improve the quality of the hearings and make the judge's job
easier.8" When parents are not represented by counsel, the burden of
protecting their rights and trying to discover all of the relevant facts
falls on the judge. It is unrealistic to expect the judge to be able to
adequately perform both the role of judge and that of advocate for un-
represented parents. In Gault, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that
the judge could not be a substitute for counsel for one of the parties.8"
Rather than hindering the juvenile court processes, counsel for parent
respondents would ensure a more orderly presentation of information
and lighten the burden on the presiding judge.
Admittedly, the role of an attorney in juvenile court may be dif-
ferent from the role of an advocate in regular criminal courts.8" Since
the hearing is supposed to protect the child, the lawyer may need to be
more involved in fashioning remedies than is traditional. Nevertheless,
uncertainties about the exact role attorneys will play in juvenile court are
not a sufficient reason to deny appointed counsel to parents whose im-
portant fundamental rights are at stake.
79. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
80. Id. at 18.
81. See 387 U.S. at 26; Neglect Proceedings, supra note 78, at 585.
82. Representation, supra note 2, at 253.
83. 387 U.S. at 36.
84. Chapman, The Lawyer in Juvenile Court: "A Gulliver among Lilliputians," 10
W. O T. L. REV. 88 (1971) ; Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors it
the New Family Court, 12 BUF. L. REv. 501 (1963).
85. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 31-1-17-1, 31-5-5-2 to -4 (Code ed. 1973); IND. CODE §§
35-14-3-1, 35-14-1-2, -4, -5 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-807, -813, -815, -816 (Supp.
1973).
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THE STATUS OF INDIANA LAW
Indiana, like many other states, does not provide counsel for
parents in juvenile court actions either by statute or judicial decision.
The failure to provide for the appointment of counsel is particularly un-
satisfactory in this state because of the multitude of statutes dealing with
parental responsibilities. 5 There is some confusion about the scope of
some of these statutes which has not been remedied by case law. 6 For
example, it is possible that an adjudication of dependency and neglect
may lead to termination of parental rights. A provision in the adoption
code permits a court to terminate parental rights either with consent or,
in certain circumstances, without consent.87 The statute does not specifi-
cally define the circumstances under which parental consent is not re-
quired. The statutory vagueness might permit the situation of a parent
without custody because of a dependency or neglect proceeding to be
treated as parental failure to communicate with or contribute to the
support of the child. The statute lists these failures as grounds for non-
consensual termination.88
Both because loss of custody, even temporarily, is a serious penalty
and because of the possibility of even more drastic consequences, Indiana
must provide counsel to protect the rights of indigent parents in de-
pendency and neglect proceedings."5
CONCLUSION
Although the states have not traditionally provided counsel for
indigent parents in dependency and neglect proceedings, the law is
changing. States are beginning to recognize the importance of protecting
parental rights in these proceedings and several now provide for counsel
either by statute or judicial decision. These reforms are responsive both
to the constitutional arguments of due process and equal protection and
to the strong practical policy reasons in favor of appointing counsel for
indigent parents.
JEAN WHITAKER SUTTON
86. Dependency & Neglect, supra note 2.
87. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 31-3-1-6, -7 (Code ed. 1973).
88. IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1-17-1 (Code ed. 1973).
89. In drafting a statute to provide for court appointed counsel, the legislature could
consult the statutory provisions in states which already provide for appointment of coun-
sel. See statutes cited note 4 supra. See also HEW, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE FOR DRAFTING
FAMILY AND JUVENILE COURT AcTs § 25 (1969); HEW, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND
FAMILY COURTS 56-57 (1966); UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT §§ 3, 13, 39; UNIFORM
JUVENILE COURT LAW §§ 22(d), 26.
